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A study of the experiences of 1,000 whistleblowers
W
elcome to this report which 
presents the inside story for 
whistleblowers as told by 1,000 
callers to Public Concern at Work’s 
(PCaW) confidential advice line.  From 
nurses and doctors, teachers and carers, 
office and factory workers, lawyers and 
accountants, our callers come from all 
walks of life.  They have in common the fact 
that they have witnessed malpractice in the 
workplace and are unsure whether or how to 
raise their concern. More commonly known 
as “whistleblowers” our clients are faced 
with a difficult dilemma: do they take the 
risk and speak up or do they look the other 
way and stay silent? 
The advice line was set up in 1993 to help workers 
speak truth to power. Over the past 20 years, PCaW 
has advised over 14,000 whistleblowers. The individuals 
who call the advice line may do so at varying points of 
their whistleblowing journey. It may be when they first 
see something going wrong in their organisation or 
much later when they have raised the matter in multiple 
places, internally and externally. They may be seeking 
advice on how to raise the concern, where else they can 
go, how best to seek feedback, what they can do to 
have the concern addressed and what to do if they are 
being victimised or have been dismissed. However the 
vast majority of individuals only ever raise their concern 
internally, which is why this report has been named the 
inside story. It tells the lesser known but far more common 
experience of whistleblowing.
PCaW advisers will ask about the nature of their concern, 
how serious it is, whether it is on-going, why they are 
looking to raise the concern, who they have raised it with 
and how it was received by colleagues or managers as 
well as asking for information about the structure of their 
business and their working relationships. PCaW also 
advises on the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA), 
the law that protects whistleblowers. Consequently, 
advisers will ask whistleblowers about their length of 
service and whether they suffered as a result of raising  
a concern.  
 
PCaW’s approach in advising our clients has rendered 
a wealth of information about the whistleblower, the 
organisation and the wrongdoing they have witnessed. 
Together with the University of Greenwich, we have 
tapped into this data to map patterns. 
In almost all of these cases the individual is concerned 
that the information about wrongdoing is, or will 
be, unwelcome. It is likely that they will already be 
experiencing difficulties when they call us. This report 
does not therefore give an overview of British workplaces 
and how serious concerns are raised and addressed, 
but is a snapshot of the barriers and challenges faced by 
those who are not sure what to do next.
Their journey is often fraught with threats, fears and 
contradictions, and can be incredibly stressful for the 
individual involved. It is clear that there are some lessons 
to be learnt from this valuable data and as the Executive 
Summary suggests, there are limited opportunities for an 
organisation to listen to their staff as a concern will only 
be raised once or twice at most. Only the very tenacious 
persevere beyond this point. More junior workers tend 
to be ignored by their employer, and the more senior 
the worker the higher the risk of dismissal. Interestingly, 
raising a concern with a regulator decreases the chance of 
dismissal, though this still results in some form of reprisal 
for many.
As we know from news headlines we all read every day, in 
our care homes and hospitals, public transport systems 
and factories, schools, banks and even in Parliament,  
too often the questions are asked after the damage has 
been done.  This report shows that we still face the risk 
of a culture of silence in UK workplaces. This is why we 
have launched a Whistleblowing Commission to make 
recommendations for change, which will report at the 
end of 2013. Whistleblowers are a vital safety net in our 
society and can prevent and detect damage and disaster.  
We all need to listen to them.
 
Cathy James 
Chief Executive    
Public Concern at Work 
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Key findings:
T
his research was funded and carried 
out by PCaW and the University of 
Greenwich (Work and Employment 
Relations Unit), on a sample of 
narratives from the PCaW database.  
The sample consists of 1,000 cases from 
the PCaW advice line between 20 August 
2009 and 30 December 2010. We coded the 
experience of the whistleblower at point of 
contact. We provide many individuals with 
advice on what to do, however the vast 
majority of individuals do not call us back 
to let us know what action they took or the 
outcome. In only 62 cases were we  
informed of final outcomes. As such much  
of the information below relates to 
information given to us of the experiences  
of whistleblowers up until the point they 
seek advice from PCaW.
From our research we know that the typical whistleblower 
is a skilled worker or professional who has been working 
for less than two years, who is concerned about a 
wrongdoing that is on-going, affects wider society and 
has been occurring for less than six months. The concern 
is raised at the organisation at most twice with line then 
middle management and the whistleblower is most likely 
to experience no response from management (either 
negative or positive). Where management do respond the 
most common response is a formal reprisal. The most 
likely response to the concern is that nothing is done. 
Junior staff are more likely to be ignored than those in 
senior positions, who are more likely to be dismissed.
A third of whistleblowers who contact us are from the 
health and social care sectors. Those in financial services 
are more likely to see wrongdoing stopped or properly 
investigated, as are those in care. However both are 
likely to feel that their position has worsened and in care, 
individuals are more likely to resign. Those working in 
local government have poorer outcomes in having a 
concern addressed and in health individuals are most 
likely to describe their position as worsening throughout 
the process. 
For the few that raise a concern a third or fourth time it is 
at this point it becomes more likely that the matter will be 
addressed but also more likely that the whistleblower will 
be dismissed or subjected to reprisal. In half of the cases 
where we knew final outcomes the wrongdoing had  
been stopped, but most individuals were still struggling  
on some level.
The findings indicate that organisations may be getting 
better at addressing wrongdoing but they are still  
shooting the messenger. 
Most striKing is the huge missed 
Opportunity by line anD midDle manageMent 
to address a conceRn effectively at an 
early sTage and protecT the WhisTlebloWer. 
The expectation or fear of individuals that they will 
be dismissed is also too frequently right, though they 
are more likely to experience formal action short of 
dismissal. Action short of dismissal may be an indication 
of employers’ fear of litigation under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, a sign that the law is at least in part 
working. However the high incidence of formal reprisal 
suggests that much more needs to be done to protect 
whistleblowers pre-dismissal and deter employers from 
taking formal action.  
The combination of the above demonstrates why 
speaking up in the workplace may seem futile or 
dangerous to many individuals. We remain at risk of a 
culture of silence existing in too many workplaces where  
few will be willing to pursue their concern to a degree that 
stops or prevents harm.
The research has provided additional evidence that 
the effectiveness of whistleblowing in the UK must 
be reviewed. To this end PCaW has established 
a Whistleblowing Commission which will run a 
public consultation on the effectiveness of existing 
whistleblowing arrangements in the UK, including UK 
business practices. The findings and conclusions of 
this research will be considered in detail as part of the 
Whistleblowing Commission’s work in 2013 and their 
overall recommendations for change.
Francesca West 
Director of Policy
Public Concern at Work
Ciara Bottomley
Advisor
Public Concern at Work 
Dr Wim Vandekerckhove
Senior Lecturer in Organisational Behaviour
University of Greenwich
Type of wrongdoing
•  Ethical and financial concerns are the most common  
 types of wrongdoing followed closely by work safety. 
Top six industries
•  The top six industries are health, care, education,   
 charities, local government, and financial services.
Who is harmed by the wrongdoing?
•  In 74% of the cases the wrongdoing involved harm  
 outside the workforce, e.g. consumers or   
 patients were affected. 
How often does the wrongdoing take place?
•  The vast majority of callers to the advice line witness  
 wrongdoing which happens more than once or where  
 the risk is on-going. 
How long has the wrongdoing been taking 
place?
•  86% of our sample said that the wrongdoing took   
 place for less than two years.
How powerful is the wrongdoer?
•  The number of calls climbs in line with how powerful  
 the wrongdoer is within the workplace. The more   
   powerful the wrongdoer the more likely the   
 whistleblower is to contact PCaW. This denotes the  
 need for advice is linked with fear of reprisal. 
How many times do whistleblowers raise a 
concern and where do they go?
•  Within our sample of 1,000 cases, concerns were   
 raised 1,514 times, 82% of which was internal, 15%  
 external, and 3% to a union.  
•  The majority of whistleblowers (44%) raise a concern  
 only once, and a further 39% will go on to raise a   
 concern a second time.
•  This shows that employers usually have up to two  
 opportunities to listen and respond to a concern. 
•  Of those that raise the concern three times (119), 60%  
 continue to raise a concern internally. 
•  After first exhausting internal options, some   
 whistleblowers may raise a concern externally.   
 Only 22 individuals (2%) raised their concern four   
 times. However even on the fourth attempt to raise the  
 concern the numbers of those using external routes  
 are still equal to the numbers of those making internal  
 disclosures (47.6% for both).
•  Four individuals first raised their concern with the   
 media (0.5%). Only two individuals raised their 
 concern with the media on the second, third and  
 fourth atttempt. 
Whistleblower’s position
•  53% of those who contact us are skilled or   
 professional workers.
What responses are they met with?
•  60% of those who called our advice line did not   
 report any response from management (either negative  
 or positive).
•  40% (399 people) of our sample mentioned responses  
 from management when raising a concern. 
 Of the 40% where workers told us of a response, the  
 most common response to the individual was formal  
 action short of dismissal such as demotion,  
 suspension or disciplinary. 33% of those who  
 experienced an actual response experienced formal  
 reprisal at the first attempt, increasing to 39% at the  
 second attempt and 50% at the third attempt.
•  Dismissal is the second most common response   
 with 24% of individuals being dismissed after raising  
 a concern once, 29% after raising a concern twice and  
 32% after raising a concern a third time. 
 However the response individuals most commonly  
 say they fear is dismissal, which increases as the   
 journey continues. 66% of those who feared a specific  
 type of response told us they feared dismissal at first  
executive summaRy
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 attempt, this increases to  71% at second attempt  
 and 84% at third attempt. This fear is disproportionate  
 to actual experience.
•  Other reprisal such as blocking resources and   
 informal reprisal (such as verbal harassment   
 or ostracism), are experienced more than they are  
 anticipated or threatened, and decrease as the journey  
 continues.
–  Blocking resources – 15% of those who   
 received a response experienced having their   
 resources blocked at both first and second   
 attempts, decreasing to 6% at third attempt.
–  Informal reprisal – 21% of those who received   
 a  response experienced informal reprisal at first  
 attempt, 12% at second attempt decreasing to 6%  
 at third attempt.
Does the way in which the concern is raised 
have an effect on the outcome?
•  Raising a concern as a grievance had negative   
 outcomes for the whistleblower as there was a higher  
 chance of formal reprisal at the first attempt (50%) and  
 dismissal at the second attempt (55%). 
•  Raising a concern with the line manager and following  
 up with higher management was most readily   
 supported by management. Raising a concern  
 with the line manager at the second attempt led  
 to more informal reprisal than formal reprisal than  
 with other recipients. This is in contrast with raising  
 the concern with higher management, which tended  
 to result more in the whistleblower being dismissed  
 if they raised it with higher management first, and  
 in blocking resources or formal reprisal at a  
 second attempt.
•  Raising the concern with a specialist channel resulted  
 more than with other recipients in informal reprisal  
 and blocking resources, but led less to formal reprisal  
 and dismissal.
•  Raising a concern with a regulator at first attempt also  
 led to more informal reprisal and blocking resources,  
 but less to formal reprisal and dismissals. If the 
 concern was raised with a regulator at second  
 attempt, this led to more formal reprisal whilst  
 dismissal remained lower (16%).
Does the whistleblower’s position in the 
organisation make a difference?
•  In organisations where whistleblowers encounter   
 reprisal, whistleblowers who are lower in the  
 hierarchy tend to be tolerated longer. The more   
 powerful the whistleblower the sooner they are likely to  
 be dismissed. This may be because they are deemed  
 more of a threat due to an expectation that they will  
 do more to expose the wrongdoing having fewer   
 internal options to raise a concern. 
•  Unskilled workers, administrative workers and   
 management are less likely to resign in the   
 first instance. However executives are much   
 more likely to resign, where they do not, their   
 position worsens as matters progress and they are 
 eventually silenced or move on. This is unsurprising  
 given that executives are likely to be raising issues that  
 may challenge the overall leadership of an   
 organisation and may feel obliged to leave   
 the organisation if the matter cannot be resolved. 
Responses of co-workers
•  Only 20% of whistleblowers stated they experienced a  
 response from co-workers.
•  If whistleblowers experience responses from co-  
 workers, they are most likely to experience informal  
 reprisal and this tends to occur when the concern is  
 raised with the line manager (65%) or specialist   
 channels (100%). 
•  Formal reprisal by co-workers is most likely when   
 a concern is raised with higher management (46%).  
 There was also some support from co-workers (2%)  
 when raising with higher management.
Response to concern
•  Overall the most common response is that nothing  
 is done about the concern. However the likelihood of  
 any investigation (where the whistleblower has a low or  
 high expectation) increases significantly from first   
 attempt (20%) to the third attempt (52%). Additionally  
 by the third attempt it is more than three times as likely  
 that an investigation where the whistleblower has a  
 high expectation, has been triggered (34%).
•  In finance there is a much higher likelihood that action  
 is taken, either in an investigation trusted by the   
 worker (16% at the first attempt, 29% at the second)  
 or stopped at the second attempt (12%). In only two  
 cases was there a third attempt to raise the concern in  
 this sector.
•  Those working in care have the highest expectations  
 that the wrongdoing will be stopped and that the   
 investigation will be good.
•  Those working in local government have the lowest  
 expectations that the wrongdoing will be stopped and  
 that the investigation will be satisfactory throughout  
 the process of raising a concern.
•  Whistleblowers from all professional backgrounds felt   
 that little was being done to address the    
 wrongdoing. However, with the exception of unskilled  
 workers, this perception usually decreased as the   
 journey continued.
Length of service
•  39% of our sample have been working for their   
 employer for less than two years.
Health
•  16% of individuals (164 people) indicated that they  
 had a health problem as a result of raising a concern. 
•  Across all industries of those who indicated they had a  
 health problem, 20% were still at work and 80% were  
 on sick leave. 
•  In the top six industries, comparatively more   
 whistleblowers with a health problem are on sick leave  
 (around nine out of 10), except for education.
Outcomes throughout the journey 
•  An average seven out of 10 individuals stated that their  
 position worsened each time they raised a concern.
•  Those working in financial services were    
 most likely to feel at an early stage that their position  
 had worsened due to whistleblowing (81% at the first  
 attempt). Thereafter they are more likely to resign or  
 stay silent than workers in other sectors.
•  Care workers are unlikely to feel silenced, though   
 they are also more likely than other sectors to resign  
 at early and later stages (42%). This may be a   
 reflection of the fluidity of the labour market in sectors  
 that are predominantly privatised. 
•  Those working in health were most likely to describe  
 their situation as worsening throughout the journey.  
 As with the care sector and local government, it is  
 unlikely workers in this sector will feel they must   
 remain silent after raising a concern.
•  Executives are the most likely group to resign at   
 the first attempt compared with unskilled workers,  
 administrative workers and management. 
 
Final outcomes
•  The majority of whistleblowers are still  
 struggling (85%), this includes where they  
 have not received feedback, are unhappy  
 with the investigation, continue to receive  
 detrimental treatment at work or where they  
 have lost their jobs and are still trying to  
 see the concern addressed. It is important  
 to  note however, this is based on a small 
 percentage of our findings.
•  In contrast, only in 38% of the cases, where  
 we had this information, was the wrongdoing  
 not acted upon.
•  In 38% of the cases, where we had this  
 information, the wrongdoer had not received  
 any sanction.
•  54% of our sample said that the wrongdoing  
 was eventually stopped. Compared with  
 the number of whistleblowers still struggling,  
 it seems that organisations are better at  
 focussing on correcting wrongdoing than on  
 safeguarding the whistleblower from harm. 
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cOnClusions
Methodology
Each time an individual contacts us for advice, we take notes on the nature of the concern and the unique situation 
of the whistleblower. This helps us to give 
advice when the whistleblower calls back. 
We enter these notes on case files in our 
database. Thus, for each whistleblower we 
advise, our database includes a narrative of 
their whistleblowing journey.
For this research, we did a content analysis of 1,000 of 
these narratives. Together with the University of Greenwich, 
we developed a code book of variables and categories 
which we then used to code these narratives.
To avoid using case files from on-going cases, we started 
with entries in the PCaW database from December 2010 
and worked backwards in time until 1,000 narratives had 
been coded. Thus, the sample consists of 1,000 cases from 
the PCaW advice line between 30 December 2010 and 20 
August 2009. We only included entries where the contact 
with the whistleblower was by phone. We excluded entries 
where the call for advice came from those other than the 
whistleblower. We further excluded entries where there 
was no information on the type of wrongdoing or type of 
organisation the whistleblower was working for.
For confidentiality reasons, a PCaW staff member coded 
the narratives. This staff member was specially trained by 
a researcher from the University of Greenwich. Hence the 
research team consisted of these two people. Between 
March and July 2012, both researchers independently 
coded the same 90 narratives. These 90 were first cleared 
of any content that would allow the identification of the 
organisation or individuals by PCaW to ensure confidentiality 
in relation to the users of the advice line. The researchers 
first coded 20 and then 30 narratives to develop the code 
book. A further 10 narratives were double coded at three 
subsequent instances to gain a shared understanding of the 
coding categories and to ensure consistent coding.  
At each instance differences in coding would be discussed 
and clarified. The PCaW researcher would then go back 
and recode the narratives already entered into the research 
database. A shared understanding was reached after the 
third session. A final double coding of 10 random narratives 
at the end of July 2012 revealed no differences.
Data entry was finalised at the end of October 2012. The 
researcher from the University of Greenwich then analysed 
the data using SPSS. All variables were treated as nominal. 
A Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test was carried out for each 
variable. All variables used in this report showed to be non-
random at a statistical significance of p < .001.
It is important to point out this research is based on 
secondary data. The narratives were written by PCaW 
staff for the purpose of giving advice, not for research 
purposes. The implication is that not every case included 
data for all variables. We indicate in the report the size of the 
subsample (N) which provided relevant data for the findings 
we present.
This research has been approved by the University of 
Greenwich Research Ethics Committee (Ref 11/12.3.5.21). 
This research is independent. It was funded by PCaW and 
the Work and Employment Relationships Unit (WERU) of the 
University of Greenwich. 
O
ur research has highlighted a 
number of avoidable problems in the 
whistleblower’s journey. We set out 
here a number of observations based 
on the findings of this research:
For organisations
The vast majority of whistleblowers say they have 
received no response from management and their 
concern is ignored at point of contact. Additionally 83% 
of individuals only raise a concern twice and usually with 
line then middle management. This demonstrates a huge 
missed opportunity by line and middle management to 
address a concern effectively at an early stage and protect 
the whistleblower. This will foster a view in the workforce 
that if you raise a concern, nothing will be done. Long 
term, this may lead to a silent or wilfully blind workforce. 
To ensure organisations capture and handle a concern 
effectively, organisations should train frontline managers 
on how to be proactive, identify whistleblowing concerns, 
handle problems well and support the whistleblower. 
This Will fosteR a vieW in the wOrKforce 
that if you raise a concern, nothing will be 
Done. long terM, this may lead to a silent oR 
Wilfully blind WorkfoRce.
The disproportionately high fear of dismissal is likely 
due to the common public perception that if you blow 
the whistle you will be dismissed. Additionally too many 
workers suffer formal reprisal. Both responses are usually 
visible to other employees and will likely deter others 
from speaking up. As such all organisations should 
ensure there is zero tolerance of the victimisation of 
whistleblowers. 
The majority of individuals in this study have been 
employed for less than two years and raise a concern 
about wrongdoing that has occurred for less than six 
months. This highlights the importance of organisations 
ensuring whistleblowing arrangements are well 
communicated, promoted and refreshed with the existing 
workforce and on induction.
For individuals
Raising a concern as a grievance tends to result in poor 
outcomes so individuals should find their whistleblowing 
policy and seek support at an early stage, if needed from 
their union, professional body or PCaW. Dismissal is not 
as frequent an outcome as feared, with two thirds of 
whistleblowers not experiencing any negative response 
from management. 
Many individuals experience a better response if they 
raise a concern more than twice. However this should be 
balanced against the higher chance of a negative  
formal response when raising a concern for the third or 
fourth time. 
Escalating a concern to a regulator at the second or  
third time a concern is raised increases the chances of 
the concern being addressed and decreases the chances 
of dismissal. However the likelihood of formal reprisal is 
increased. This demonstrates the value of an individual 
obtaining external oversight, though they should proceed 
with caution. 
For regulators
Many workers report a poor personal outcome when 
raising a concern internally or with a regulator.  
Regulators could consider following up with individuals 
that have raised a concern and should develop a 
clear policy on how complaints of mistreatment of 
whistleblowers could form part of assessment and 
compliance frameworks. 
There is little guidance on effective whistleblowing 
practices [1] and it is likely that the quality of 
whistleblowing arrangements will vary widely. Regulators 
may assist their regulated entities by producing guidance 
on this issue.
Escalating a concern to a regulator at the second or third 
time a concern is raised, increases the chances of the 
concern being addressed and decreases the chances 
of dismissal for the individual. However the likelihood of 
formal reprisal is also increased. Regulators may wish to 
do more to encourage and guide individuals as to when to 
contact them.
Legal protection
The expectation or fear of individuals that they will be 
dismissed is too frequently right, though they are more 
likely to experience formal action short of dismissal. This 
may be an indication of employers’ fear of litigation under 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, a sign that the 
law is at least in part working. However the high incidence 
of formal reprisal suggests that much more needs to be 
done to protect whistleblowers pre-dismissal and deter 
employers from taking formal action. The combination 
of the above demonstrates why speaking up in the 
workplace may seem futile or dangerous to many 
individuals. We remain at risk of a culture of silence 
existing in too many workplaces where only the tenacious 
few will be willing to pursue their concern to a degree that 
stops or prevents harm.
[1] For existing guidance see the Whistleblowing Arrangements: Code of Practice published by the British Standard Institution and Public Concern at Work 
(www.pcaw.org.uk/bsi) 
The top six industries on the advice line were: care, 
health, education, charities, local government, and 
financial services.
According to Census 2011 data, 13% of employed 
people in England and Wales work within the health and 
social care sector, 10% work in education, 6% work in 
public administration, and 4% in financial services. In our 
sample, callers working in the health and care sectors add 
up to 29%, compared with the 13% in the Census data. 
This means that those working in caring environments, 
where patients, vulnerable people or children are involved, 
tend to contact the advice line more than other sectors. 
Perhaps this is due to the nature of their work, media 
attention, policy agendas, scandals or awareness of 
PCaW. 
c. Ethical distance
Apart from the type of wrongdoing and the industry 
these occurred in, we also looked at whether or 
not the wrongdoing fell within the whistleblower’s 
job responsibility. A wrongdoing that falls within a 
whistleblower’s job responsibility would be where a 
member of the finance team was aware of false invoicing. 
As invoicing would conceivably form part of their job 
responsibility they are ethically close to the wrongdoing; 
whether they were involved or not was coded accordingly. 
Conversely an example of the wrongdoing falling outside 
a whistleblower’s job responsibility would be where a care 
worker becomes aware that the care home manager was 
misleading a regulator. A care worker would not typically 
be in a position to mislead a regulator so ethically they 
are quite distant from the wrongdoing, again their level 
of involvement was coded. This was done by comparing 
the roles of both the whistleblower and the wrongdoer 
and determining how ethically distant the whistleblower is 
from the wrongdoing.
Table 1.3 Ethical distance of the whistleblower to the 
wrongdoing
No contribution 
(wrongdoing outside of job responsibility)
437  
(45%)
No contribution 
(wrongdoing within job description)
460  
(47%)
Contributed to wrongdoing 
(within job responsibility)
63  
(6%)
Contributed to wrongdoing 
(outside of job responsibility)
15  
(2%)
We had information for 975 cases in our sample for this 
variable (N=975)
• In the vast majority of cases (92%) the  
 whistleblower states that they have not contributed  
 to the wrongdoing, while 8% admit that they have  
 been involved. 
•  47% said that the wrongdoing falls under their 
 responsibility but they did not contribute to the   
 wrongdoing, while 45% said that they did not   
 contribute to the wrongdoing and that it does not fall  
 under their responsibility.
How we understand these findings:
This demonstrates that the majority of those contacting 
the advice line are witnesses to wrongdoing as opposed 
to perpetrators. 8% have contributed in some way, the 
majority of these (6%) stating that the wrongdoing was 
part of their job responsibility and they were complicit 
(for example an office manager who followed instructions 
to raise an invoice she knew to be false). The remaining 
2% of our sample stated that they had contributed to 
wrongdoing that was not part of their role, (for example a 
caretaker of a school falsifying exam results).
There is little disparity between those who view the 
wrongdoing as falling under their job responsibility 
and those who see it as someone else’s responsibility, 
demonstrating that staff are willing to speak up whether 
or not they are ultimately responsible. 
d. Who is harmed by the wrongdoing?
In analysing the impact of the wrongdoing we 
distinguished between cases where the wrongdoing 
caused:
•  Outsider harm, e.g. where a teacher raises a child  
 protection concern at a school.
•  Insider harm not including the whistleblower, e.g.  
 where an IT manager raises a breach of data   
 protection which affects a colleague.
•  Insider harm including the whistleblower, e.g. health  
 and safety in the workplace.
• Both insider and outsider harm, e.g. where there are  
 multiple concerns, where bank staff feel pressured to  
 mis-sell to customers,  presenting a risk to staff  
 and consumers.
 Table 1.4 Impact of the wrongdoing
Outsider harm 569 (57%)
Insider harm (not including the whistleblower) 68 (7%)
Insider harm (including the whistleblower) 193 (19%)
Both in and outsider harm 164 (17%)
We had sufficient information on this for 994 of the cases 
in our sample (N=994). 
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a. Type of wrongdoing
The top five concerns in the sample (N= 1,000) were 
ethical, financial malpractice, work safety, public safety 
and patient safety.
Table 1.1 Top-five concerns
Ethical Financial 
Malpractice
Work Safety Public 
Safety
Patient  
Safety 
191 (19%) 187 (19%) 156 (16%) 106 (11%) 81 (8%)
Other concerns were about environment, discrimination/
harassment or consumer, competition and regulation.
•  Ethical concerns could include: abuse of position,  
 cronyism, breach of policy, breach of confidentiality,  
 or manipulation of scientific research.
•  Work safety usually relates to health and safety in  
 the workplace, principally affecting employees. This  
 could include unsafe machinery or no appropriate  
 safety equipment. 
•  Public safety is where the safety of the public is at  
 risk. This could include faulty wiring on a train   
 track or unsafe meat in a supermarket.
 
How we understand these findings:
Ethical and financial concerns were the most common 
types of malpractice followed closely by work safety.  
These concerns take place across all industries, while 
concerns such as patient safety or work safety are more 
sector specific to health and social care. 
An ethical concern may be subjective and often occurs 
in grey areas where workers may be unsure whether or 
not they should raise the matter. This may explain why 
more individuals seek support when faced with an ethical 
concern. 
With regards to those who witness financial malpractice, 
they may be likely to seek advice because of the serious 
implications for the wrongdoer or organisation if they 
raise a concern. The malpractice may involve criminal 
activity (e.g. theft or bribery) or the individual may be at 
risk themselves if they do not report the concern, as in the 
case of accountants or FSA authorised persons.  
 
 
Additionally financial malpractice can take place across all 
organisations. While ethical or financial concerns are the 
most statistically common, on a sector by sector basis the 
number of concerns about patient safety concerns remains 
very high considering it is likely they occur only in care or 
health. 
b. Industry
Table 1.2 Industries where callers worked
Health 148 (15%)
Care 143 (14%)
Education 111 (11%)
Charities 89 (9%)
Local government 69 (7%)
Financial services 67 (7%)
Retail 44 (4%)
Manufacturing 33 (3%)
Food/Bev 29 (3%)
Transport 27 (3%)
Construction 21 (2%)
Leisure/hospitality 21 (2%)
Utilities 16 (2%)
Science/Tech 12 (1%)
Insurance 9 (1%)
Central government 8 (<1%)
Police 7 (<1%)
Housing 6 (<1%)
Legal services 5 (<1%)
Pharmaceutical 4 (<1%)
Quango 4 (<1%)
Agriculture/Forestry 3 (<1%)
Armed services 2 (<1%)
Mining/Oil 2 (<1%)
Media 1 (<1%)
Other 100 (10%)
Unknown 19 (2%)
APPENDIX ONE:  detailed findings
1. perceiving the WrOngdoing
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a. How many times do whistleblowers  
raise a concern?
We looked at the first four events in a whistleblower’s 
journey, which include where the whistleblower actually 
raises the concern or expresses an intention to raise 
the concern.  In 868 cases a concern was actually 
raised and in 132 cases an intention to raise a concern 
was expressed. There were only some cases when the 
whistleblower raised the concern more than four times, 
however this was highly exceptional. 
From our total sample of 1,000 advice line cases, in 868 
of these the concern had been raised at least once, in 483 
at least twice, in 141 at least three times, and in 22 cases 
the concern had been raised four times. In 132 cases 
people expressed only an intention to raise a concern.
Table 2.1 Number of times a whistleblower raises the 
concern
Raises  
once
Raises  
twice
Raises  
three times
Raises  
four times
385 (44%) 342 (39%) 119 (14%) 22 (3%)
Most whistleblowers (44%) actually raise a concern only 
once, however another 39% raised a concern twice. It 
is important to note that while there is a large decrease 
from those who raise a concern twice to those who raise 
a concern three or four times, the whistleblower may 
continue on their journey and raise a concern in one of 
the ways we have advised. It is unusual that they will call 
us back to let us know what they decided to do or how 
the matter may have been resolved.
How we understand these findings:
Whistleblowers’ motivation decreases each time they are 
faced with raising a concern. This is most obvious in the 
disparity between those who raise a concern twice and 
those who raise a concern three times. This shows that 
employers usually have up to two opportunities to listen 
to individuals. 
This drop in motivation could be explained by a number of 
factors, e.g. they may have suffered some form of reprisal, 
fear losing their job, or have lost faith that anything will 
be done.  Additionally individuals usually want to raise a 
matter locally, where they know the managers that they 
are contacting. Once these first two options have been 
exhausted, going elsewhere may feel alien or challenging. 
If employers do not have clear, well promoted policies it 
is unlikely an individual will know where to go after they 
have raised a matter locally and it has not been resolved.
b. Where do they go?
When developing the codebook for this research it was 
clear that whistleblowers can raise a concern either within 
the organisation (internal), outside of the organisation 
(external) or where relevant, with their trade union. We 
then looked at how this changed depending on how many 
times the whistleblower tries to raise a concern.
We coded the recipients as follows:
•  Internal - wrongdoer, line manager, higher manager,  
 grievance, specialist route
•  External - regulator, independent bodies
 
•  Union - union representative
To avoid ambiguity, the following categories cover:
•  Grievance – where the individual raises a concern  
 usually with personal issues, via the formal  
 grievance procedure
•  Specialist – audit, compliance, through a  
 whistleblowing hotline, professional body (advisory)
•  Independent bodies – police, MP, NGO, media
There is also an ‘other’ category which covers situations 
where the whistleblower raises a concern to someone 
who falls outside of the above categories, to customers 
or funders for example. It also covers the situation where 
they have spoken to a colleague about their concern 
(not typically raising a concern) but have been found out 
and suffered repercussions. The numbers below do not 
include the counts for ‘other’.
Table 2.2 Internal and external whistleblowing
Internal External Union
Attempt1 
(N=849)
777 (91%) 57 (7%) 15 (2%)
Attempt2 
(N=477)
350 (73%) 108 (23%) 19 (4%)
Attempt3 
(N=140)
84 (60%) 50 (36%) 6 (4%)
Attempt4 
(N=21)
10 (47.6%) 10 (47.6%) 1 (4.8%)
2. raising a conceRnHow we understand these findings:Where only insider harm was occurring, this included harm to the whistleblower in 19% of the cases. In 7% of 
the cases the wrongdoing involved insider harm to others 
than the whistleblower.
In 74% of the cases the wrongdoing involved harm to 
outsiders (57% only outsider harm and 17% both outsider 
and insider harm). This means that most of the concerns 
(74%) in our sample relate to harm that the whistleblower 
witnessed that affects not only the organisation but also 
the wider public, be it child protection, patient safety, 
financial malpractice.
e. How often does the wrongdoing  
take place?
We coded the wrongdoing in our sample cases as either a 
one-off incident or recurring incidents, i.e. one incident of 
abuse in care or on-going neglect. We also looked at the 
risk depending on the type of wrongdoing and the stage 
of concern, e.g. where the fire escape is consistently 
blocked in a school: the incident is anticipated but the 
risk is on-going, this would be categorised as recurring 
wrongdoing.  
Table 1.5 Frequency of the wrongdoing
One-off occurrence 140 (14%)
Recurring 858 (86%)
From the cases in our sample (N=998), 14% called 
for a one-off wrongdoing and in 86% of the calls the 
wrongdoing was recurring.
How we understand these findings:
The vast majority of callers to the advice line witness 
wrongdoing which happens more than once or where the 
risk is on-going. 
f. Duration of the wrongdoing
Table 1.6 Duration of the wrongdoing
Anticipated 50 (10%)
Less than 1 month 67 (13%)
1 - 6 months 161 (30%)
6-24 months 175 (33%)
2-5 years 55 (10%)
More than 5 years 22 (4%)
We had sufficient information about this in 530 of the 
cases in our sample (N=530).
• 86% of our sample said that the wrongdoing took  
 place for less than two years (this does not  
 necessarily imply that the whistleblower has been  
 raising the concern for two years).
• 53% said that the wrongdoing took place for less than 
 six months. 
The vast MajOrity of callers To the  
advice line Witness Wrongdoing which 
happens more than once or where  
the risK is on-going. 
How we understand these findings:
Just over half of our sample contacted us when the 
concern had been taking place for under six months, 
showing that while whistleblowers may not always seek 
advice at the first step they do tend to seek advice 
quite early on in their journey. This also indicates that 
individuals are motivated to speak up at an early stage if 
they witness wrongdoing and can act as an early warning 
system for an organisation. 
g. Power of the wrongdoer 
This was coded to reflect the balance of power between 
the whistleblower and the wrongdoer, whether the 
wrongdoer held a position of less, equal or more power in 
the organisation. 
Table 1.7 Wrongdoer power as compared to 
whistleblower’s position
Wrongdoer is
less powerful
Wrongdoer is
equally powerful
Wrongdoer is
more powerful
41 (4%) 231 (24%) 715 (72%)
We had sufficient information in our sample for 987 cases 
(N=987).
The majority of our sample described the wrongdoer as 
more powerful than the whistleblower in the organisation. 
It is perhaps not surprising that whistleblowers seek 
advice when they have witnessed wrongdoing by 
someone more powerful than themselves as this is likely 
to be where the perceived risk in raising the concern and 
challenging the wrongdoing is higher for the worker. 
C. Whistleblower’s position
This section was divided into the following categories:
•  Unskilled (e.g. carers, support workers, bartenders)
•  Administrative/clerical positions (e.g. office   
 administrators, secretaries, advisers)
•  Skilled (e.g. brokers, chefs, engineers)
•  Professionals (e.g. nurses, doctors, teachers,   
 accountants)
•  Management (e.g. line managers, general managers)
•  Executive (e.g. board members, chair persons)
•  Unknown (e.g. scientist, researcher, specialists)
Table 2.4 Whistleblower’s position
Unskilled 128 (13%)
Skilled 272 (27%)
Administrative 80 (8%)
Professional 261 (26%)
Managerial 150 (15%)
Executive 24 (2%)
Unknown 85 (9%)
Our sample ranges from unskilled and skilled 
workers, followed by administrative/clerical positions, 
professionals, managers and executives at the top of the 
organisational structure. 
Similar numbers of unskilled workers (13%) and 
managers (15%) blow the whistle. This suggests that 
whistleblowers can come from all career paths, from the 
bottom of an organisation to the top. From this we can 
see that typically our callers are skilled workers (27%) and 
professionals (26%). 
As 53% of our calls come from skilled workers and 
professionals, it seems as though a worker’s level of 
expertise affects their propensity to seek advice or access 
our support.  This could be due to a variety of factors, for 
example, their education, knowledge of whistleblowing, 
the sector in which they work, professional ethics, 
guidance from professional bodies or professional duties.
d. Does the position of the whistleblower 
make a difference? 
Our findings suggest it does. People in different positions 
within an organisation tend to use different routes to try to 
raise their concern.
Fig 2.2 Wrongdoer as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position (in %)
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Fig 2.3 Line manager as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position  (in %)
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Fig 2.4 Higher management as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position  (in %)
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Fig 2.1 Internal and external whistleblowing
Attempt1 (N=849)
Attempt2 (N=477)
Attempt3 (N=140)
Attempt4 (N=21)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Internal External Union
Table 2.3 Recipients per attempt
Attempt1
(N=868)
Attempt2
(N=483)
Attempt3
(N=141)
Attempt4
(N=22)
Wrongdoer 61 (7%) 7 (1.5%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Line 
manager
447 (52%) 68 (14%) 5 (3%) 0 (0%)
Higher 
manager
195 (22%) 159 (33%) 22 (16%) 2 (9%)
Union rep 15 (2%) 19 (4%) 6 (4%) 1 (5%)
Specialist 37 (4%) 48 (10%) 20 (14%) 2 (9%)
Regulator 31 (4%) 54 (11%) 29 (21%) 4 (18%)
Independent 
bodies
22 (2.5%) 52 (11%) 19 (14%) 4 (18%)
Grievance 37 (4%) 68 (14%) 36 (25%) 6 (27%)
Media 4 (0.5%) 2 (0.5%) 2 (1%) 2 (9%)
Unknown 19 (2%) 6 (1%) 1 (1%) 1 (5%)
This means that in total, within our sample of 1,000 
cases, a concern was raised 1,514  times, 82% of which 
was internal, 15% external, and 3% to a union.  
•  The majority of whistleblowers tend to raise their  
 concern internally on at least three occasions.
 
•  On the third attempt 60% of whistleblowers continue  
 to raise a concern internally.
•  The number of those making external disclosures  
 increases as the journey continues. It does not,  
 however, surpass the amount of those willing to make  
 internal disclosures and there are still equal numbers  
 of those making internal and external disclosures at  
 the fourth attempt (47.6% for both) though this is  
 based on the 22 cases where individuals raised a  
 matter a fourth time.
•  By the third and fourth attempt whistleblowers are  
 most likely to pursue the matter via a grievance.
A grievance procedure places the onus on an individual 
to prove their complaint. A whistleblower is a witness, 
passing on information to those with a responsibility to 
address the problem. As such the grievance vehicle is 
unsuited to a whistleblowing concern as a witness should 
not have to prove their concern.
We checked whether the preferred recipient differed 
depending on which industry the whistleblower worked 
in. We did not find any strong departures from the  
overall pattern.
fear of reprisal, inertia on ManagemenT’s 
part Or lack of feedbaCk may leaD an 
employee tO bloW The whistle exteRnally.
How we understand these findings:
Employees are willing to give their employers a number 
of opportunities to look at the concern before they 
make an external disclosure. If a concern is ignored 
or not addressed at an earlier stage only the more 
tenacious individuals will pursue this, carrying a risk 
for organisations if they fail to address the concern 
quickly. To mitigate the risk of missing an important 
warning, organisations need to ensure strong lines of 
communication and good training in line and middle 
management. This indicates a need for an integrated 
compliance culture throughout an organisation. 
The use of grievance procedures will drive a 
whistleblowing concern into a formalised process and 
is likely to indicate an escalating workplace dispute. 
The grievance procedure may be used for a number of 
reasons, e.g. failure to investigate, a poor investigation, or 
because the whistleblower is experiencing victimisation. 
The grievance process is only suitable for the latter, where 
a whistleblower is seeking redress for poor treatment. As 
such the onus is on employers to ensure staff know the 
difference between grievances and whistleblowing, that 
whistleblowers are listened to at an early stage, protected 
from victimisation, and to ensure that all staff know that 
they can raise a concern, before the matter becomes a 
more complex workplace dispute. 
Fear of reprisal or inertia on management’s part or lack 
of feedback may lead an employee to blow the whistle 
externally. However, overall these statistics show that 
there is a reluctance to raise the concern externally.  
On the advice line whistleblowers often fear losing their 
job if they raise a concern externally. It is particularly 
challenging for those who are working with patients, 
vulnerable adults or children, as they may fear  
passing on confidential information in breach of their 
professional duties. 
Unskilled and skilled workers
Our findings show that this group of workers is less 
likely to approach higher management, which is in direct 
contrast with those in more senior positions. Unskilled 
and skilled workers are more likely to approach the 
wrongdoer and are more likely to make a disclosure to 
independent bodies as a second step than other workers. 
Specialist channels are generally not on the radar of blue 
collar workers and it seems as though this key group of 
workers do not explore internal options aside from their 
line manager. As a third step they approach the regulator 
or raise a grievance. 
This shows the importance of line management in 
understanding whistleblowing and escalating concerns. 
Readily available whistleblowing policies will also help this 
group to raise a concern responsibly. 
Administrative workers
In the first instance, those in administrative positions are 
more likely than others to raise their concern through a 
grievance, with higher management or with a union rep 
than other workers and were less likely to approach their 
line manager. As their journey proceeds, they are slightly 
more likely than others to raise a concern with a regulator, 
or through a specialist channel. At later stages, they are 
more likely than others to explore external options.
This group of workers is more aware of their options, in 
terms of specialist channels and regulators, but did not 
necessarily make the right choice when raising a concern. 
As we will see in part 3d, raising a concern through a 
grievance almost always results in a negative outcome. 
Professionals, management and executives
Those in more senior positions are more likely to raise 
a concern through a specialist channel at any step 
(professionals, managers, and especially executives). 
Managers and executives are more likely to raise their 
concern initially to higher management (e.g. board) and 
raise a grievance thereafter.
This group is less likely to raise a concern with a regulator 
but more likely to go to the media at an early stage. 
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3. responding tO WhistlebloWeRs
a. What was the response from 
management?
We noted that there are a number of common responses 
from management that whistleblowers may experience. 
These were categorised as follows:
• Informal: closer monitoring, ostracised, verbal   
 harassment.
• Blocking resources: blocking access to emails,   
 information, training, hours.
• Formal: relocation, demotion, job reassigned,   
 suspended, disciplined.
• Dismissal.
• Support: taking the issue seriously is also categorised  
 as support. If an individual feels supported by their  
 employer it is less likely that they will be seeking our  
 advice and support.
We noted also that while these may be the common 
responses they are not always acted upon. We coded 
whether these responses were expected or feared, 
threatened or had actually happened.
• 60% of those who called our advice line did not report  
 a response from management (either positive or  
 negative)
• The remaining 40% (399 people) of our sample  
 mentioned responses from management after raising a  
 concern.
• Of these:
 –  74 (19%) feared or expected a response;
 –  29 (7%) had been threatened by management; and 
 –  296 (74%) had actually experienced a response  
  from management.
• Taking each response separately, we looked at when  
 they occur in the whistleblower’s journey (omitting  
 attempt four as the number of cases was too low)  
 and whether they are feared, threatened or actually  
 take place.
Fig 2.5 Union as preferred recipient per whistleblower’s 
position (in %)
Attempt1 Attempt2 Attempt3
Un
sk
ille
d
Sk
ille
d
Ad
mi
n
Pr
ofe
ss
ion
al
Ma
na
ge
me
nt
Ex
ec
uti
ve
Un
kn
ow
n
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fig 2.6 Specialist channel as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position (in %)
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Fig 2.7 Regulator as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position (in %)
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Fig 2.8 Independent body as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position (in %)
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Fig 2.9 Grievance procedure as preferred recipient per 
whistleblower’s position (in %)
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Fig 2.10 Media as preferred recipient per whistleblower’s 
position (in %)
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How we understand these findings:
Most individuals will not receive a response from 
management at all, either positive or negative. While 
this counteracts a common view that whistleblowers are 
usually victimised or dismissed, it also indicates a lack 
of feedback, communication or support. Coupled with 
the results below (5.7) the result of this will be that many 
individuals will not see the value of raising a concern as 
nothing will be done.
As fear or threat of dismissal surpasses the actual 
response this may indicate a cultural barrier to raising a 
concern. Common perceptions that this is the inevitable 
outcome heighten fear within the workplace and may 
lead to a culture of silence or only a single individual 
being prepared to speak up. The lower than anticipated 
rate of dismissal could also be due to the employer’s 
fear of litigation under PIDA if they dismiss an individual. 
However much needs to be done by employers to 
counteract this fear if staff are to feel safe speaking up. 
Additionally this highlights the need for robust protection 
for employees pre-dismissal as formal reprisals are the 
most likely response from management.
Blocking resources is a form of workplace bullying 
perpetrated by management and tends to occur later 
down the line. Bullying, subjective in nature, can 
be invisible to others and is difficult to prove. This 
seems to be a comparatively common way of pushing 
whistleblowers out of an organisation next to the more 
direct action of dismissal.  
 
b. Does the response from management 
differ according to industry?
• Those in financial services are more frequently 
 dismissed on the first attempt to raise a concern  
 than any other sector but much less likely on  
 second attempt. 
• In health dismissal is the most likely management  
 response at first attempt but much less likely than  
 other sectors to occur when a concern is raised a  
 second time.
• In all other sectors the likelihood of dismissal increases 
 when a concern is raised a second time, though most  
 sharply in education.
• In local government it is more likely an individual will  
 receive support or formal reprisal.
How we understand these findings:
The variation per industry may be due to the types of 
concern that are raised, the impact of escalating and the 
quality of systems in place. Without more information on 
the above no further conclusions can be drawn.
c. Does the response from management 
differ according to type of wrongdoing?
Our findings suggest it does. The top five types of 
wrongdoing were ethical issues, financial wrongdoing, 
patient safety, worker safety, and abuse in care.
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Fig 3.1 Overall expected, threatened, and actual 
responses from management at first three attempts (in %)
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Fig 3.2 Expected responses from management (% from 
all who raised)
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Fig 3.3 Threatened responses from management (% from 
all who raised)
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Fig 3.4 Actual responses from management (% from all 
who raised)
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Where reprisal is mentioned, most whistleblowers contact 
PCaW when they have actually experienced reprisal from 
management rather than when they fear reprisal or have 
been threatened with reprisal. 
Where there is a response from management, formal 
reprisal is the most common. This includes disciplinary 
action, suspension, written warnings.
The fear of dismissal increases as the whistleblower 
continues to raise the concern, as does the actual chance 
of dismissal. However the fear of dismissal greatly 
outweighs the number of times an individual is actually 
dismissed.
Fig 3.5 Response from management according to industry (in %)
19 20
Financial malpractice
Those who raised a concern about financial malpractice 
were more likely to have their resources blocked at 
the first instance with formal reprisal following later on. 
Notably, they experienced less informal reprisal and were 
less likely to be dismissed the longer the journey went on. 
Ethical
Those who raised an ethical concern were initially met 
with more informal reprisal compared to other types of 
concern. However, those who continued to raise the 
concern were more likely to be dismissed. This may be 
due to the fact that such a concern will fall outside the 
categories of wrongdoing covered by the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998.
In summary, with concerns such as abuse in care and 
financial malpractice, areas which have both received 
significant media attention, management tend to block 
resources or resort to formal reprisal and are less likely 
to dismiss whistleblowers. Where the concern is deemed 
more ambiguous or subjective (such as varying ethical 
codes) dismissal is more likely. 
d. Does the response from management 
differ depending on who the concern was 
raised with?
Table 3.1 Responses from management per recipient at 
first attempt (in %)
Recipient
(N=297)
Informal
64  
(22%)
Blocking
44  
(15%)
Formal
97  
(33%)
Dismissed
71  
(24%)
Support
20  
(7%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Wrongdoer 50% 0% 33% 11% 6%
Line manager 18% 18% 29% 24% 11%
Higher manager 21% 13% 30% 32% 4%
Specialist 50% 33% 17% 0% 0%
Regulator 43% 57% 0% 0% 0%
Independant 
body
14% 0% 57% 29% 0%
Grievance 21% 29% 50% 0% 0%
Union rep 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Unknown 0% 10% 50% 40% 0%
Table 3.2 Responses from management per recipient at 
second attempt (in %)
Recipient
(N=176)
Informal
21  
(12%)
Blocking
27  
(15%)
Formal
69  
(39%)
Dismissed
51  
(29%)
Support
8  
(5%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Wrongdoer 50% 0% 0% 50% 0%
Line manager 22% 19% 25% 28% 6%
Higher 
manager
6% 21% 42% 25% 6%
Specialist 25% 19% 31% 19% 6%
Regulator 15% 15% 54% 16% 0%
Independent 
body
9% 5% 48% 33% 5%
Grievance 0% 5% 40% 55% 0%
Union rep 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Unknown 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Table 3.3 Responses from management per recipient at 
third attempt (in %)
Recipient
(N=54)
Informal
3 
(6%)
Blocking
3 
(6%)
Formal
27 
(50%)
Dismissed
18 
(32%)
Support
3 
(6%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Wrongdoer 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Line manager 0% 25% 50% 25% 0%
Higher manager 0% 0% 36% 43% 21%
Specialist 0% 0% 50% 50% 0%
Regulator 0% 0% 75% 25% 0%
Independent 
body
25% 12% 38% 25% 0%
Grievance 9% 9% 55% 27% 0%
Union rep 0% 0% 100% 0% 0%
Unknown 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
• Of all recipients, raising the concern with the  
 wrongdoer is more likely to result in informal reprisal. 
 The likelihood of dismissal increased significantly from  
 first attempt (11%) to second attempt (50%).
• Of all recipients, raising the concern with a specialist  
 channel was more likely to result in informal reprisal  
 and blocking resources, but led less to formal reprisal  
 and dismissal.
ThOse who Raised a Work safety Concern 
Were more liKely To be dismissed at fiRst 
anD second aTtempT than those Who raised 
Other types of concern.
Fig 3.6 Responses from management at two attempts for 
patient safety concern (in %)
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Fig 3.7 Response from management at two attempts for 
financial wrongdoing concern (in %)
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Fig 3.8 Response from management at two attempts for 
work safety concern (in %)
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Fig 3.9 Response from management at two attempts for 
abuse in care concern (in %)
Abuse in care Attempt1 Abuse in care Attempt2
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Fig 3.10 Response from management at two attempts for 
ethical concern (in %)
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How we understand these findings:
Patient safety
Whistleblowers who raise a patient safety concern were 
more likely to suffer formal reprisal throughout the journey 
and less likely to encounter informal reprisal than those 
raising other types of wrongdoing. Also, those who were 
dismissed for raising a patient safety concern, tended to 
be dismissed at their first attempt to raise the concern.
Abuse in care
Those who raise a concern about abuse in care were 
comparatively more likely to see their resources blocked 
or suffer formal reprisal along the journey. However, these 
whistleblowers were less likely to be dismissed.
Work safety
Those who raised a work safety concern were more likely 
to be dismissed at first and second attempt than those 
who raised other types of concern. Formal reprisal was 
also experienced more at first attempt, while informal 
reprisal or blocked resources were experienced less.
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Table 3.5 Managerial responses per whistleblower’s 
position, at second attempt (N=176)
WB power Informal
21 
(12%)
Blocking
27 
(15%)
Formal
69  
(39%)
Dismissal
51  
(29%)
Support
8  
(5%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 26% 7% 41% 26% 0%
Skilled 4% 20% 43% 27% 6%
Admin 25% 13% 37% 25% 0%
Professionals 10% 13% 42% 29% 6%
Managers 8% 21% 30% 33% 8%
Executives 20% 20% 20% 40% 0%
Table 3.6 Managerial responses per whistleblower’s 
position, at third attempt (N=54)
WB power Informal
3  
(6%)
Blocking
3  
(6%)
Formal
27 
(50%)
Dismissal
18  
(33%)
Support
3  
(6%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 0% 0% 40% 60% 0%
Skilled 7% 7% 50% 22% 14%
Admin 20% 0% 20% 60% 0%
Professionals 7% 0% 64% 22% 7%
Managers 0% 20% 50% 30% 0%
Executives 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Executives and managers
From looking at the first two times the whistleblower tries 
to raise a concern, we found that the more senior the 
whistleblower, the more likely they are to be dismissed. In 
analysing the first two attempts to raise a concern (as the 
third attempt had low numbers) a whistleblower higher up 
in the organisational hierarchy is more likely than others to 
be dismissed when first raising a concern. If they are not 
immediately dismissed in the first instance, they are more 
likely than others to experience harassment or blocked 
resources. This pattern is consistent in the second 
attempt. 
 
Professionals
Conversely, professionals are more likely to have their 
resources blocked on their first attempt to raise a concern. 
Unskilled, skilled and administrative
Unskilled and, skilled and administrative staff usually 
experience formal reprisal at an early stage.
in organisations WheRe whistleblOweRs 
enCounteR repRisal, whistleblOweRs who 
are lOweR in the hierarchy Tend To be 
tolerated longer, while WhistlebloWers 
WiTh a higher pOsitiOn tend to be disMissed 
muCh earlier.
How we understand these findings:
In organisations where whistleblowers encounter reprisal, 
whistleblowers who are lower in the hierarchy tend to 
be tolerated longer, while whistleblowers with a higher 
position tend to be dismissed much earlier. This may 
be because they are deemed more of a threat due to 
an expectation that they will do more to expose the 
wrongdoing. 
f. What was the response from co-workers?
We distinguished the following common responses from 
colleagues:
• Informal - where the whistleblower is bullied, harassed  
 or ostracised. 
• Formal - where the whistleblower has a formal  
 accusation or a grievance entered against them.
• Support - where the whistleblower experiences  
 support from colleagues on a wider basis than raising  
 the concern with others.
As with the responses from management, we coded 
whether the response was expected, feared, threatened 
or whether the response has actually happened. 
Responses were noted each time the whistleblower raised 
a concern. 
• 20% (200) of our sample mentioned specific 
responses from colleagues. We assume that the 
remaining 80% received no subjectively significant 
response from colleagues.
• Of these 200:  
 - 9% expected a response in the first instance, 14% in  
 the second instance; 
 - 2% received a threat in the first instance, 2% in the  
 second instance; and 
 - 89% received an actual response in the first instance, 
 84% in the second instance.
Actual reprisals are probably a driving factor for 
whistleblowers to seek advice from PCaW. 
• Raising a concern with a regulator at the first attempt  
 was more likely to result in informal reprisal and  
 blocking resources, but less likely to result in formal  
 reprisal and dismissal. If the concern was raised with a  
 regulator further on however, this tended to result in  
 formal reprisal whilst the likelihood of dismissal  
 remained lower than with other recipients.
• Of all recipients, raising a concern through a grievance  
 led to blocking resources and formal reprisal at the first 
 attempt, and to dismissal at the second attempt.
• Support was most likely to come from the line manager 
 at the start, and later on from higher management.  
 Raising the concern with the line manager at the  
 second attempt tended to lead to informal reprisal  
 but less to formal reprisal than with other recipients.  
 This is in contrast with raising the concern with higher  
 management, which tended to result in the  
 whistleblower being dismissed at the first attempt and  
 in blocking resources or formal reprisal at the second  
 attempt.
How we understand these findings:
It seems as though a whistleblower is most likely to 
receive support if they raise a concern initially with line 
management and then escalate their concern to higher 
management. It is worth re-iterating at this point that in 
only 40% of cases did whistleblowers mention a response 
from management, suggesting that in 60% of cases 
management’s response is not of significance to the 
whistleblower when they contact us for advice. 
Raising a concern with the wrongdoer is most likely 
to result in informal reprisal for the whistleblower. The 
response probably mirrors the informal way in which the 
concern was raised. The higher likelihood of dismissal at 
the second attempt could be because the wrongdoer is 
the manager or owner of the organisation. 
Raising a concern with specialist routes and regulators 
early on seems less likely to result in formal reprisal and 
dismissal. This shows that with internal or regulatory 
oversight, managerial behaviour may be moderated. This 
does not mean that the whistleblower’s position at work 
is any easier, as they are more likely to be subjected to 
informal reprisal or see their resources blocked. This more 
formal approach to whistleblowing produces a clearer 
paper trail and the response of management could be 
linked with fear of litigation. 
Raising a concern with a regulator at a later stage 
however, is more likely to lead to formal reprisal short  
of dismissal. This shows that the more attempts to raise  
a concern the more at risk the position of the 
whistleblower becomes. 
This could be linked with the whistleblower’s inability 
to raise a concern anonymously or confidentially with 
the regulator at this stage if they have already raised 
a concern internally, or perhaps the employer feels 
undermined by the whistleblower or fears a cover-up may 
be exposed. 
Raising a concern as a grievance has poor consequences 
for the whistleblower as there is a higher chance of 
formal reprisal and dismissal.  Mixing personal grievances 
with whistleblowing detracts from the concern itself. It 
may imply that there are other issues in question which 
contribute to the increased chance of serious negative 
reprisal. This is in part due to the fact that the grievance 
process is usually invoked at a later stage when an 
individual has felt ignored or victimised, due to breakdown 
in relationships or using the wrong means to raise a 
concern. It may also relate to the impact of using this 
formal process in a whistleblowing context. 
This indicates a need for more public education on this 
issue and for unions to emphasise that a grievance is 
not the best means to raise a concern as it places an 
individual in the position of having to prove their case 
rather than relay the information as a witness. For 
employers, to avoid the use of grievances where the 
individual is using the process to complain about how they 
have been treated as a whistleblower, more will need to be 
done to ensure that whistleblowers are properly supported 
and protected from victimisation.
e. Does the whistleblower’s position make a 
difference in how management responds?
Our findings suggest it does. For whistleblowers who have 
experienced reprisal, the patterns differ depending on 
their position as the journey unfolds.
Table 3.4 Managerial responses per whistleblower’s 
position, at first attempt (N=297)
WB power Informal
65  
(22%)
Blocking
44 
(15%)
Formal
97  
(33%)
Dismissal
71  
(24%)
Support
20  
(7%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 24% 4% 56% 12% 4%
Skilled 25% 14% 28% 26% 7%
Admin 21% 16% 42% 16% 5%
Professionals 21% 21% 27% 25% 6%
Managers 21% 13% 32% 30% 4%
Executives 0% 14% 14% 29% 43%
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the culture of the organisation. This was coded by looking 
at who perpetrated the wrongdoing and how the concern 
was received, e.g. where responses from management 
were indicative of complicity or cover up. 
We had information on this variable for 979 of the cases in 
our sample.
• 33% indicated they had concern about wrongdoing in  
 their organisation where a corrupt individual was   
 involved; 
• 25% indicated a corrupt group within the organisation  
 was involved; and 
• 42% indicated they perceived the whole organisation  
 as corrupt. 
Our findings also suggest that organisational culture goes 
together with different patterns of how management 
responds to people raising a concern. Figure 3.11 shows 
responses from management regardless of organisational 
culture. Figures 3.12 to 3.14 show responses by 
management per organisational culture (N1=291, N2=169, 
N3=51).
Table 3.9 Response from management per organisational 
culture at first attempt (N=291)
 Org Culture Informal
63  
(22%)
Blocking
44  
(15%)
Formal
94  
(32%)
Dismissed
70  
(24%)
Support
20  
(7%)
  % in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Corrupt 
individual
30% 12% 27% 22% 9%
Corrupt group 24% 20% 35% 12% 9%
Corrupt 
organisation
16% 14% 34% 32% 4%
Table 3.10 Response from management per 
organisational culture at second attempt (N=169)
 Org Culture Informal
20 (12%)
Blocking
26 (15%)
Formal
68 (40%)
Dismissed
49 (29%)
Support
6 (4%)
  % in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Corrupt 
individual
9% 9% 42% 36% 4%
Corrupt group 15% 12% 52% 15% 6%
Corrupt 
organisation
11% 22% 31% 35% 1%
Table 3.11 Response from management per 
organisational culture at third attempt (N=51)
 Org Culture
Informal
3  
(6%)
Blocking
3  
(6%)
Formal
26  
(51%)
Dismissed
17  
(33%)
Support
2  
(4%)
  % in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Corrupt 
individual 11% 0% 45% 22% 22%
Corrupt group 0% 22% 45% 33% 0%
Corrupt 
organisation 6% 3% 55% 36% 0%
Fig 3.12 Responses from management – regardless of 
organisational culture (in %)
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Fig 3.13 Responses from management where wrongdoing 
involved a corrupt individual (in %)
Attempt1 Attempt2 Attempt3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Informal Blocking Formal Dismissal Support
Fig 3.11 Overall actual responses from co-workers (% of 
N1=178, N2=81)
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The WhistlebloWer is likely to suffer 
formal reprisal where The wrongdoer is 
a Co-Worker and they are awaRe of the 
identity of WhistlebloWer. This coulD be a 
grievanCe for bullying or haRassMent oR a 
counter allegation of some Description. 
Table 3.7 Responses from co-workers per recipient at 
first attempt (in %)
Recipient
(N=178)
Informal
104  
(58%)
Formal
69  
(39%)
Both informal 
& formal (I&F)
1 (1%)
Support
4  
(2%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Wrongdoer 63% 31% 0% 6%
Line manager 65% 35% 0% 0%
Higher 
manager
48% 46% 2% 4%
Specialist 100% 0% 0% 0%
Regulator 0% 100% 0% 0%
Independent 
body
0% 100% 0% 0%
Grievance 75% 25% 0% 0%
Union rep 50% 50% 0% 0%
Unknown 0% 0% 0% 100%
Table 3.8 Responses from co-workers per recipient at 
second attempt (in %)
Recipient
(N=81)
Informal
34  
(42%)
Formal
44  
(54%)
Both informal & 
formal (I&F)
1 (1%)
Support
2  
(3%)
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Wrongdoer 0% 100% 0% 0%
Line manager 41% 53% 0% 6%
Higher 
manager
50% 47% 3% 0%
Specialist 63% 37% 0% 0%
Regulator 25% 50% 0% 25%
Independent 
body
44% 56% 0% 0%
Grievance 0% 100% 0% 0%
Union rep 0% 0% 0% 0%
Unknown 0% 100% 0% 0%
How we understand these findings:
If there are reprisals from co-workers, these are most 
likely to be informal reprisals (58% across recipients) and 
they are most likely to happen when raising a concern 
with the line manager (65%) or specialist channels 
(100%). Formal reprisal by co-workers seem most likely 
when a concern is raised with higher management (46%). 
There was also some support from co-workers (2%) when 
raising a concern with higher management.
As the whistleblowing path continues, formal reprisal 
from co-workers become more likely (at second step 
54% compared to 42% informal), and is most likely to 
come from co-workers when raising a concern with an 
independent body (56%), through a grievance (100%), or 
to line management (53%).
The more often an individual raises a concern the more 
likely they are to suffer formal reprisal from co-workers.
The whistleblower is likely to suffer formal reprisal where 
the wrongdoer is a co-worker and they are aware of the 
identity of the whistleblower. This could be a grievance 
for bullying or harassment or a counter allegation of some 
description. 
g. What is the importance of organisational 
culture?
The culture of the organisation is coded according to the 
individual’s perception and is drawn from the narrative 
of the case. We coded how systemic the wrongdoing 
is by looking at whether the wrongdoer is: a corrupt 
individual; a corrupt group; or a corrupt organisation. A 
whistleblower may expressly state or implicitly indicate 
Fig 3.14 Responses from management where wrongdoing 
involved a corrupt group (in %)
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How we understand these findings:
A small percentage of whistleblowers call us before 
they have raised a concern when they anticipate 
wrongdoing or first identify a risk. This could be due 
to lack of awareness of PCaW or the fact that at first 
instance many whistleblowers do not identify that they 
are whistleblowing until they encounter a difficulty. The 
majority of those who contact PCaW will be calling 
because something has already gone wrong. 
Many whistleblowers had already embarked on a 
whistleblowing journey before they contacted us or 
sought other support. 38% of whistleblowers called us 
after they had raised a concern once and 39% called 
us after they had raised concern twice. This shows 
a persistence to see the concern addressed before 
seeking support. More needs to be done to raise 
awareness of what might constitute whistleblowing in the 
workplace and the advice and support that we offer as 
an organisation so that employees contact us at an early 
stage for advice.
b. Length of service
We coded the length of time the whistleblower had been 
working at the organisation when they contacted PCaW. 
Table 4.2 Length of time the whistleblower had been 
working in the organisation
Less than 2 years 277 (39%)
Between 2 and 5 years 235 (33%)
Between 5 and 10 years 87 (12%)
More than 10 years 118 (16%)
We had this information for 717 cases in our sample 
(N=717)
• 39% have been working less than two years with 
 their employer.
• 33% have been working between two and five years.
• 72% have been working for their employer for less  
 than five years.
How we understand these findings:
Of our sample 72% of whistleblowers have worked for 
their employer for less than five years.  Almost four out 
of 10 have worked with their employer for less than 
two years indicating that new staff are more willing to 
speak up. This is a cautionary note for businesses who 
will want to consider how to ensure that staff are aware 
of arrangements for speaking up as part of induction 
procedures and that whistleblowing arrangements are 
regularly refreshed. This is particularly the case for 
businesses that have high staff turnover. 
New employees may well be more likely to speak up 
because they are less likely to accept poor or illegal 
practices. Complex relationships, sensitivity to the 
working culture or wilful blindness can prevent long term 
employees from speaking up. Another factor we have 
observed on the advice line that may prevent long term 
staff from speaking up, is where they have been aware of 
the wrongdoing for some time and remained silent: this 
creates a sense of ‘guilt by association’. However the 
most common reason why individuals do not speak up is 
the fear that nothing will be done. This may be  
an ingrained sense in long term employees who are 
basing this on their own previous experience or how 
they have observed problems in the workplace being 
addressed historically.
There has been a concern that the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act (PIDA) is misused by those who do not 
have other employment rights as they do not have the 
requisite length of service. However, as these statistics 
demonstrate, the most significant demographic of 
whistleblowers we hear from tend to have worked at 
their organisation for less than two years. Our top five 
concerns (ethical, financial malpractice, work safety and 
patient safety) are all in the public interest as opposed to 
private employment matter. This demonstrates the value 
of PIDA acting as a day one right.
c. Health of the whistleblower
Of the 164 callers who told us they had a health problem, 
we also noted who was still at work and who was off sick. 
This may or may not be as a result of raising a concern. 
Common illnesses we hear about are work related stress, 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Table 4.3 Whistleblowers with health problems
Health problem but still at work 32 (20%)
Health problem and on sick leave 132 (80%)
25 26
How we understand these findings:
Perhaps obviously, when the wrongdoing is perceived 
to involve a corrupt organisation, there is less support 
on any attempt to raise a concern. Initially support is 
expected more than twice as much when a perceived 
corrupt group is involved (10%) than when a perceived 
corrupt individual (3%) or perceived corrupt organisation 
(4%) is involved. However, support is just as likely to be 
given when the wrongdoing involves a perceived corrupt 
individual or group (both 9%), but half as likely when the 
whole organisation is perceived as corrupt (4%).
An impact can also be seen for reprisal: if a whistleblower 
perceives the organisation as corrupt they are more likely 
to be dismissed at any attempt to raise a concern. If the 
organisations did not dismiss them straight away, they 
block their resources. When the wrongdoing involves a 
perceived corrupt group, the whistleblower was more 
than in other cases, retaliated against first by blocking 
resources, and later on with informal and formal reprisal. 
There were fewer dismissals.
Surprisingly there were not fewer dismissals when the 
wrongdoing involved a perceived corrupt individual. 
These whistleblowers tended to be either dismissed or 
met with informal reprisal along their journey. 
Fig 3.15 Responses from management where 
wrongdoing involved a corrupt organisation (in %)
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a. When and how many times does the 
whistleblower call PCaW?
These statistics are made up of two different variables, 
looking at how many times the whistleblower raises a 
concern and when they contact PCaW. The first four 
attempts were coded.
• 5% called before any wrongdoing took place and  
 before they raised a concern. This would be where  
 they anticipated wrongdoing or identified a risk.
• 38% called after raising or intending to raise their  
 concern for a first time.
• 39% after raising or intending to raise their concern a  
 second time. 
• 96% called the advice line up to 4 times, with 44%  
 calling twice, and 10% calling three times.  
Table 4.1 Time of first call
Before they raise concern 51 (5%)
Raised once 377 (38%)
Raised twice 388 (39%)
Raised three times 149 (15%)
Raised four times 35 (3%)
We had this information for our total sample (N=1,000)
Fig 4.1 Time of first call
Before they raise Raised once Raised twice Raised three times Raised four times
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2 38 39 15 3
Please note that figures differ from table 2.1 as the figures 
in table 4.1 include additional numbers where the caller 
expressed an intention to raise a concern, but may not 
have done so already, when they called.
• 16% of individuals (164 people) indicated that they  
 had a health problem.
 
• This means across all industries of those who   
 indicated they had a health problem, 20% are still at  
 work and 80% are on sick leave. 
• In the top six industries, comparatively more   
 whistleblowers with a health problem are on sick leave  
 (around nine out of 10), except for education.
How we understand these findings:
A small, but worrying, percentage of whistleblowers 
experience health problems. It is likely that individuals will 
seek support when they have taken sick leave as they will 
have removed themselves from the immediate source of 
stress and will be looking for advice and solutions. 
However the vast majority of whistleblowers who 
experience a negative impact on their health will go on 
sick leave demonstrating that one of the many negative 
implications of not handling whistleblowing well is the 
possibility of increased staff absences in either the long  
or short term.
5. impaCt On the WhistlebloWer 
   and The wrongdoing
We coded both what happened to the whistleblower and 
the wrongdoing throughout the journey and, where we 
had the data, the final outcome; see section 6.
We looked at how outcomes for the whistleblower and 
wrongdoing throughout the journey differ depending on 
the industry and position of the whistleblower.
a. For the whistleblower 
Where the whistleblower commented on a change to 
their position following each attempt to raise a concern, 
we coded it accordingly. This was commented on in 327 
cases at first attempt suggesting that in 68% of cases the 
whistleblower’s position was not affected when they first 
attempted to raise a concern.
We had five categories:
• No change – where the whistleblower directly  
 indicated that nothing had happened to worsen or  
 improve their personal position, for example where the  
 whistleblower is ignored.
• Worsened – where the whistleblower directly  
 indicated that their personal position changed for the  
 worse after they raised a concern, for example where  
 the whistleblower suffers reprisal.
• Improved – where the whistleblower directly  
 indicated that something happened to improve their 
 personal position, for example where the  
 whistleblower is rewarded.
local gOveRnment anD health departed from 
the overall patTern, with a continual 
deCline of the WhistlebloWer’s situaTion.
• Silent – where the whistleblower felt unable to  
 speak up again.
• Resigned – where the whistleblower decided to resign.
By industry
Table 5.1 Changes to whistleblower at first attempt for top 
six industries (N=327)
No change
13%
Worsened
69%
Improved
1%
Silent
7%
Resigned
10%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 15% 68% 0% 8.5% 8.5%
Health 15% 67% 0% 7% 11%
Education 17.5% 70% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5%
Charities 18% 69% 0% 3% 10%
Local 
Government
22% 69% 0% 0% 9%
Finance 0% 81% 0% 9.5% 9.5%
Table 5.2 Changes to whistleblower at second attempt for 
top six industries (N=216)
 
No change
13%
Worsened
68%
Improved
1%
Silent
6%
Resigned
12%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 15% 66% 2% 0% 17%
Health 14% 73% 0% 5% 8%
Education 4% 68% 0% 14% 14%
Charities 16% 74% 0% 10% 0%
Local 
Government
17% 75% 0% 0% 8%
Finance 0% 62% 0% 23% 15%
Table 5.3 Changes to whistleblower at third attempt for 
top six industries (N=58)
 
No 
change
9%
Worsened
67%
Improved
2%
Silent
7%
Resigned
15%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 8% 50% 0% 0% 42%
Health 18% 73% 0% 0% 9%
Education 0% 60% 0% 20% 20%
Charities 0% 50% 50% 0% 0%
Local 
Government
0% 67% 0% 0% 33%
Finance 0% 50% 0% 25% 25%
How we understand these findings:
These findings show that overall, the situation of the 
whistleblower worsened less at the third attempt, with 
more whistleblowers resigning as their journey continues. 
Industries that jump out of the overall pattern are financial 
services, where the starker decline in situations worsening 
is explained by a pronounced increase in whistleblowers 
remaining silent.
Local government and health departed from the overall 
pattern, with a continual decline of the whistleblower’s 
situation. Whistleblowers in local government tend to 
resign after their third attempt, more than in other sectors.
In finance, individuals are likely to state their position has 
worsened after the first attempt to raise a concern, 81%. 
Thereafter they are more likely to resign or stay silent than 
workers in other sectors, 25% at the third attempt. Care 
workers are unlikely to feel silenced, though they are also 
more likely than other sectors to resign, 42% at the third 
attempt, and move on at early and later stages. 
By position
Table 5.4 Change to whistleblower at first attempt 
(N=327) per whistleblower’s position
No change
13%
Worsened
69%
Improved
1%
Silent
7%
Resigned
10%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 11% 75% 0% 5% 9%
Skilled 14% 68% 0% 7% 11%
Admin 13% 79% 0% 4% 4%
Professional 12% 68% 1% 7% 12%
Management 16% 71% 0% 10% 3%
Executive 0% 50% 0% 20% 30%
Unknown 13% 64% 3% 10% 10%
Table 5.5 Changes to whistleblower at second attempt 
(N=216) per whistleblower’s position
No change
13%
Worsened
68%
Improved
1%
Silent
6%
Resigned
12%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 10% 71% 2% 0% 17%
Skilled 13% 69% 2% 5% 11%
Admin 22% 57% 0% 7% 14%
Professional 12% 71% 0% 10% 7%
Management 12% 64% 0% 9% 15%
Executive 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
Unknown 27% 55% 0% 9% 9%
Table 5.6 Changes to whistleblower at third attempt 
(N=58) per whistleblower’s position
No change
9%
Worsened
67%
Improved
2%
Silent
7%
Resigned
15%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 0% 60% 0% 0% 40%
Skilled 14% 57% 0% 7% 22%
Admin 0% 83% 0% 0% 17%
Professional 14% 65% 0% 7% 14%
Management 9% 73% 9% 9% 0%
Executive 0% 0% 0% 50% 50%
Unknown 0% 100% 0% 0% 0%
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How we understand these findings: 
Unskilled workers (9%), administrative workers (4%) 
and management (3%) are less likely to resign in the first 
instance. Unskilled workers are the least likely to stay 
silent throughout the journey. However, executives are 
much more likely to resign (30%): where they do not, 
their position worsens as matters progress, and they 
are eventually silenced (50%) or move on (50%). This 
is unsurprising given that executives are likely to be 
raising issues that may challenge the overall leadership 
of an organisation and may feel obliged to leave the 
organisation if the matter cannot be resolved. 
b. For the wrongdoing
We coded at each attempt to raise a concern, how 
the whistleblower perceived the impact of raising the 
concern on what the organisation was doing about the 
wrongdoing. Coding categories were:
Nothing is done – where the whistleblower expresses 
that no action has been taken, for example where the 
whistleblower has been ignored or the wrongdoing is 
denied.
Investigation (low expectations) – where the recipient of 
the information is conducting an investigation but the 
whistleblower lacks confidence in the investigation, for 
example where the investigation is being headed by 
someone the whistleblower does not trust or fears that 
there will be a whitewash.
Investigation (high expectations) – as above but where the 
whistleblower has confidence in the investigation.
Stopped – where the wrongdoing is stopped.
Changes to wrongdoing overall and by 
sector
Table 5.7 Changes to wrongdoing at first attempt (N=637) 
for top six industries
Nothing is 
done
74%
Investigation 
(low expect)
10%
Investigation  
(high expect)
10%
Stopped
6%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 65% 8% 16% 11%
Health 74% 7% 11% 8%
Education 66% 17% 11% 6%
Charities 76% 10% 10% 4%
Local 
Government
75% 14% 7% 4%
Finance 65% 14% 16% 5%
Table 5.8 Changes to wrongdoing at second attempt 
(N=309) for top six industries
Nothing is 
done
63%
Investigation  
(low expect)
12%
Investigation  
(high expect)
19%
Stopped
6%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 54% 13% 26% 7%
Health 62% 15% 15% 8%
Education 58% 15% 24% 3%
Charities 65% 16% 19% 0%
Local 
Government 79% 13% 4% 4%
Finance 53% 6% 29% 12%
Table 5.9 Changes to wrongdoing at third attempt (N=71) 
for top six industries
Nothing is 
done
44%
Investigation 
(low expect)
18%
Investigation 
(high expect)
34%
Stopped
4%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Care 38% 8% 46% 8%
Health 50% 33% 17% 0%
Education 33% 17% 50% 0%
Charities 33% 0% 67% 0%
Local 
Government 20% 40% 20% 20%
Finance 50% 50% 0% 0%
How we understand these findings:
Overall the most common response is that nothing is 
done about the concern. However, this decreases over 
time as the likelihood of any investigation (low and high 
expectation combined) increases significantly from the 
first attempt (20%) to the third attempt (52%). By the 
third attempt the likelihood of an investigation with high 
expectation it is greater than three times more likely than 
at first attempt. 
In finance there is a much greater likelihood that action 
is taken, either in the form of an investigation trusted by 
the worker (16% at first attempt, 29% at second) or the 
wrongdoing is stopped at the second attempt (12%). 
This however collapses at the third attempt, though these 
statistics are based on only four cases (financial services 
at third attempt). 
In care there is a high expectation that there will be 
a good investigation (16%) or the wrongdoing will be 
stopped (11%) at an early stage.
In local government more individuals said nothing was 
done to address the concern and low expectations of a 
good investigation is more likely in this sector throughout 
the process of raising a concern.
Changes to wrongdoing by whistleblower’s 
position
Table 5.10 Changes to wrongdoing at first attempt 
(N=637) per whistleblower’s position
Nothing is 
done
74%
Investigation 
(low expect)
10%
Investigation  
(high expect)
10%
Stopped
6%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 80% 4% 10% 6%
Skilled 73% 12% 9% 6%
Admin 70% 11.5% 11.5% 7%
Professional 75% 9% 10% 6%
Management 70% 14% 14% 2%
Executive 63% 12% 19% 6%
Unknown 79% 13% 4% 4%
Table 5.11 Changes to wrongdoing at second attempt 
(N=309) per whistleblower’s position
Nothing is 
done
63%
Investigation  
(low expect)
12%
Investigation 
(High expect)
19%
Stopped
6%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 65% 12% 17% 6%
Skilled 60% 10% 23% 7%
Admin 55% 15% 15% 15%
Professional 63% 12% 20% 5%
Management 68% 9% 21% 2%
Executive 50% 25% 25% 0%
Unknown 65% 20% 10% 5%
Table 5.12 Changes to wrongdoing at third attempt 
(N=71) per whistleblower’s position
Nothing is 
done
44%
Investigation  
(low expect)
18%
Investigation  
(High expect)
34%
Stopped
4%
% in table to be compared with % at top of columns
Unskilled 80% 0% 20% 0%
Skilled 31% 23% 38% 8%
Admin 28.5% 28.5% 43% 0%
Professional 46% 25% 29% 0%
Management 44% 11% 39% 6%
Executive 0% 0% 0% 0%
Unknown 50% 0% 25% 25%
How we understand these findings: 
Across the board whistleblowers feel that nothing is being 
done to address the wrongdoing. However, this sentiment 
generally decreases the more the whistleblower persists 
in raising the concern suggesting that whistleblowers 
become more successful in getting their concern 
investigated as they pursue their journey. 
Executives seem to be most successful in getting their 
organisations to investigate their concern.
Unskilled whistleblowers are the least successful in 
getting their concern taken seriously and even at their 
third attempt organisations remained inert.
Administrative staff had consistently low expectations 
in investigations (11.5% climbing to 28.5% at the 
third attempt), with those in more senior positions, 
management (14%) and executives (19%), expressing 
more confidence in investigations.
Overall, those who said that the wrongdoing stopped 
were in the minority. While this is worrying, it must be 
remembered that this section maps outcomes after each 
attempt to raise the concern and is not the final outcome. 
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executives seeM tO be most suCcessful in getTing Their organisations To investigate 
their concern. unskilled WhisTlebloWers are The least successful in getting theiR 
concerns taken seriously anD even at Their thirD attempt oRganisations remained ineRt.
a. For the whistleblower
To conclude the inside story, we looked at what happened 
to the whistleblower, the wrongdoer and the concern at 
the end of their journey. 
While undertaking this study, we knew that there would be 
limited information for final outcomes in the PCaW client 
database. This is due to the way we take information 
from callers. Our advice is tailored to help individuals to 
raise a concern during their journey. We offer support 
and guidance along the way and advise on the law. This 
means that while we have a lot of information about the 
circumstances which cause individuals to raise a concern 
and what effect this has on them and their working 
lives, we rarely hear about when things go well or if the 
situation is resolved at the end of the process. Individuals 
tend to continue to contact the advice line while they are 
struggling. Sometimes we act as a conduit for individuals 
and are involved in raising the issue, seeking feedback 
and are aware of final outcomes. However it is more 
likely that we encourage an individual to raise a concern 
directly and let us know the outcome. We are unable to 
follow up in many cases due to the high number of cases 
we receive and the resource limitations of PCaW. 
Table 6.1 Final outcomes for the whistleblower
Still struggling 53 (85%)
Moved on 9 (15%)
Our case files included this information for 62 cases 
(N=62)
Fig 6.1 Final outcome for the whistleblower (in %)
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The overwhelming majority of whistleblowers are still 
struggling, this includes where they have not received 
feedback, are unhappy with the investigation, continue 
to receive detrimental treatment at work or where they 
have lost their jobs are still trying to see the concern 
addressed. It is important to note however, this is based 
on a small percentage of our sample.
Table 6.2 Employment Tribunal status
Considering ET ET ongoing ET settled ET lost ET won
142 (64%) 63 (28%) 8 (4%) 7 (3%) 2 (1%)
b. How many individuals make a claim?
For the cases that lead to an Employment Tribunal (ET) and 
where the whistleblower was still in contact with us, the case 
files would include information on the ET status. This was the 
case in 222 cases (N=222).
Fig 6.2 Employment Tribunal status (in %)
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Of our sample, 222 individuals mentioned taking a claim 
to an ET. The numbers are much higher than other final 
outcomes. The majority of those we speak to at the 
end of their journey are considering taking a claim. This 
denotes the final outcome for the individual. The number 
could be higher for two reasons. First, the individual is 
acutely aware of the outcome of their situation, whereas 
this may not be the case for the outcome of the concern 
or the wrongdoer. Second, as PCaW is a legal advice 
centre, and we provide advice on PIDA, we receive a lot 
of calls where individuals are also seeking advice around 
their legal rights. 
6. final outComes it is of Course impoRtanT that 
OrganisatiOns implemenT operational 
changes triggered by sTaff  
raising a concern. 
 
c. For the wrongdoer
Table 6.3 Outcomes for the wrongdoer
No change 11 (38%)
Warning 2 (7%)
Transferred 2 (7%)
Resigned 2 (7%)
Dismissed 12 (41%)
Our case files included information on this for 29 cases 
(N=29)
The outcomes in this section are mixed. 41% of our 
sample (N=29) said that the wrongdoer was dismissed 
and 38% said that nothing changed. However the data is 
based on small numbers. 
d. For the wrongdoing
Table 6.4 Outcomes for the wrongdoing
Unchanged 15 (38%)
Reduced 2 (5%)
Temporarily stopped 1 (3%)
Stopped 21 (54%)
Our case files included information on this for 39 cases 
(N=39)
Where we know the final outcome of the wrongdoing, it 
had stopped in 54% but remained unchanged in 38% of 
cases. Again, the data is based on small numbers. 
Fig 6.3 Final outcome for the wrongdoing (in %)
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Fig 6.4 Final outcome for the wrongdoer (in %)
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How we understand these findings:
When comparing the figures above, we see a striking 
difference in outcomes for the whistleblower, the 
wrongdoing, and the wrongdoer. Successful whistleblowing 
encompasses both no harm to the whistleblower, and 
correction of the wrongdoing.
Our findings suggest that organisations seem to be 
better at correcting wrongdoing than at safeguarding the 
whistleblower from harm. Whereas 85% of those who told 
us the outcome indicated they were still struggling, only in 
38% of cases where we had this information the wrongdoing 
was not acted upon. With regard to the wrongdoer, again in 
only 38% of cases there had not been any sanction.
It is of course important that organisations implement 
operational changes triggered by staff raising a concern. 
This leads to better performing organisations and is in no 
doubt in the public interest. However, correcting wrongdoing 
without proper attention to the people management aspect 
of this will not create better organisational cultures, and will 
make it harder for organisations to detect wrongdoing at an 
early stage in the future.
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